I
It was on September 19, 1648, that Florin Perier; upon instructions from Pascal, successfully performed the experiment of Torricelli's barometric tube at the top of the Puy-de-Dome (4,800 feet), and also at a point called Lafon de I' Arbre which is a little more than a third of the way up the mountain. At the summit the column of mercury measured 23 1/ 6 pouces (6 pouces = 6 1/2 inches ~pproximately) in height; at Lafon, it measured exactly 25 pouces, in comparison with the 26 7/24 pouces which it measured in the garden of the Minim fathers at Clermont. According to Pascal, this established the fact that atmospheric pressure was the cause of the suspension of the mercury in the tube, and the phenomenon a particular case of the general principle of the equilibrium of liquids.
Pascal thereupon composed his Recit de la Grande Experience, a certain number of copies of which were printed without licence some time between October and December. The R ecit is a veritable shout of triumph. "Dear reader," writes Pascal, "the universal consent of men and the throng of philosophers agree in the affirmation of this principle, that Nature would rather allow its own destruction than the smallest vacuum. Certain superior minds have adopted a more moderate principle: for although believing that Nature abhors a vacuum, they have nevertheless concluded that this abhorrence has limits and can be overcome by force; but no one has as yet advanced this third principle: that Nature has no horror of the vacuum, that she makes no effort to avoid it, and in fact admits it without difficulty and without resistance." On the one hand, therefore, we have the universal ignorance of universal mankind, and on the other hand, Pascal alone. . . .
And yet we should in all fairness not overlook the fact that four years earlier, on June 11, 1644, someone else had more modestly affirmed: "Many people have said it is impossible to produce a vacuum, others that this is possible, but not without resistance on the part of Nature and without effort. As far as I am aware, no one has ever said that a vacuum can be produced without difficulty and without any resistance on Nature's part." These lines were written by Evangelista Torricelli to his pupil Michelangelo Ricci in one of the letters in which he describes and interprets his experiment of the column of mercury. Extracts of these letters were sent by Ricci to Father Mersenne in Paris, and later Mersenne brought back from Rome complete copies which he gave to Roberval, professor of mathematics in the College de France and friend and collaborator of Pascal.
The strange similarity of these two texts would in itself be enough to dilute our enthusiasm for Pascal's triumph. But already on December 13, 1647, Descartes, in a letter to Mersenne in which he announces having received Pascal's preliminary outline (the Experiences nouvelles touchant le vide), makes the following statement: "I had suggested to M. Pascal that he investigate whether the quicksilver rose as high on the top of a mountain as it does at the foot; I do not know whether he has done so." Later, upon hearing through Huygens of Perier's successful experiment of September 19 (for Pascal had neglected to send him a copy of the Recit), he wrote to Carcavi for particulars, adding: "I should rightfully expect this from him [Pascal) rather than from you, because it was I who suggested two years ago that he perform this experiment." And again, in writing to thank Carcavi for his summary of Perier's report, he added: "I had some interest in hearing about it, as it was I who asked him, two years ago, to do this . . . otherwise it would not have occured to him as he was of the opposite opinion."
On September 24, Carcavi wrote to Descartes stating that he had asked Pascal to send him an account of the experiment. Pascal did not take the trouble to reply.
In a recent work devoted to Pascal's scientific activity, Pierre Humbert affirms that we have here a definite claim of priority, evidence that Descartes considered himself to be the first and true inventor of the famous experiment and claimed that Pascal was trying to cheat him of his just due. Thus it is that Pascalians endeavour to perpetuate the notion that Descartes was seeking to rival Pascal in scientific experiment and was moved by hostility and envy. Yet nowhere in the several letters of Descartes devoted to the subject is there the slightest claim to priority as such. Descartes asserts that he asked Pascal to perform the experiment and that he is interested in the results. His just complaint is that Pascal has failed· to observe the elementary demands of common courtesy: "I had the right to expect this from him rather than from you." He does not stress the priority of his suggestion (how could this idea enter his mind since he did not then knownor was he ever to learn-that Pascal was claiming sole rights to the experiment) ; he merely affirms that he made it, and expresses surprise that Pascal had not thought it worth his while to acquaint him with the results.
But if Descartes died unaware that a definite claim to priority and exclusive rights had been put forth by Pascal, the Cartesians remained to challenge it. In 1691 Adrien Baillet in his Vie de monsieur Descartes stated unequivocally that the experiment of the Puy-de-Dome had been carried out at M. Descartes' suggestion, "although M. Pascal concealed the fact." In the same year Father Daniel in his Voyage du monde de Descartes describes the astonishment of the philosopher when he discovered in the next world that his idea had been stolen by Pascal. In the eighteenth century, Montucla (Histoire des mathematiques, 1758) and Condillac both take sides with Descartes, as also do Bordas-Demoulin and Millet (Descartes depuis 1637, 1870 ) in the nineteenth. Nourrisson, in his Pascal physicien et philosophe ( 1885), "indulged in malevolent insinuations" against Pascal, as Charles Adam expressed it in an article in which he comes to Pascal's defence. With the Port-Royal of Sainte-Beuve, in fact, the tide had already turned, the "revival of Pascal" had begun; to Nourrisson's insinuations came replies from Ravaisson, Adam, Ernest Havet, and others. Boutroux affirmed categorically that in the very nature of things Pascal was much more likely than Descartes to accept the weight of air as the only possible explanation. The dissidents were silenced.
But not for long. In 1906, in the R evue de Paris, three marvellously documented articles from the pen of Felix Mathieu shattered the complacency of the Pascalians. For two hundred years the debate-a purely academic one-had been carried on between admirers of two great Frenchmen. Felix Mathieu had the bad taste to widen the debate to include not only the immediate events which led up to the Great Experiment, but the whole series of experiments which in the sixteen-forties solved the problem of the vacuum and revealed the phenomenon of atmospheric pressure. It thus became necessary to discuss Pascal's debt to the Italians and to Torricelli in particular, and in so doing Mathieu infinitely transcended the mere question of priority, in itself not very interesting or even significant; his articles constitute a profound psychological study of Pascal the man, from which students of the Provinciales and the Pensees can derive much profit.
Unfortunately for Brunschvicg, these articles appeared as he and Boutraux were on the point of bringing out the first three volumes of their monumental edition of Pa:1cal's works, volumes covering Pascal's mathematical and scientific works up to 1654. These were to be presented in strictly chronological sequence, and Mathieu had seriously disarranged the accepted Pascalian chronology on some very important points. Brunschvicg was obliged to do some quick thinking in order to present Pascal as if nothing had happened. This is apparent in the long introduction to the first three volumes which is devoted in large part to a refutation of Mathieu's thesis, in the abundant notes and commentaries where by many a turn of phrase he attempted to evade the evidence, and at one crucial point quite simply by the alteration of a text. (These points are covered in an article by L. Rougier, in the Mercure de France, 1931.) Brunschvicg seemed to have had the last word. Mathieu, it is true, had replied to the earlier protests of Brunschvicg and Lefranc in particular and had had no difficulty in show· ing that their defence was based on points of detail, and that they had provided no satisfactory answer to his main argument; but realizing that he was dealing with people whose minds were made up he abruptly broke off the discussion and the matter was to all intents and purposes settled.
So, at least, it would seem if one were to judge by the works devoted to Pascal during the forty years that h ave since elapsed, for most critics pretend that no such person h ad ever existed as Felix Mathieu ("or Matthieu," as Charles Pcguy insultingly and with characteristic cogency of argumentation shouted in the Cahiers de la quinzaine, "one of the greatest imposters this earth has ever borne" ) . The latest example of this is a book by Pierre Humbert (L'(Euvre scientifique de Blaise Pascal, Paris, 1947) who from first to last, including a three-page bibliography, has the impudence to omit all reference to Mathieu's articles.
Yet there were some who, from the beginning, were willing to face the issue objectively. Abel Rey, in the R evue de synthese historique, after a careful evaluation of the evidence on both sides, concluded that Mathieu's main positions had not even been breached. Father Thirion in the R evue des questions scientifiques gave what is the most lucid and coherent account of the events leading up to the Grt'!at Experiment; his evidence is if anything more damning to P ascal than Mathieu's, but in the end he refused to formulate a definite judgment. Gustave Lanson took the editors of Pascal mildly to task for assuming that the matter of chronology had been settled, but after that nothing more was heard for some years. The most candid appreciation of the case is given in what is undoubtedly the best general work on P ascal in any language; Morris Bishop, in his Pascal, the Life of Genius, has this to say: "After the publication of this article [Mathieu's] the embattled Pascalisants came in force to Pascal's aid. Although I think they proved their case, certain troublesome circumstances remain." Mr. Bishop does not say in virtue of what evidence he thinks their case was proved, but he is honest enough to mention the "troublesome circumstances." That is further than most critics will go. Nor should one fail to mention the thoroughly objective thesis devoted to the Great Experiment, presented in the University of Montpellier in 1925 by R. Arsovitch.
Priority in scientific experiment is difficult, and often impossible, to establish; a scientific discovery is not a work of art, it is not a "creation ex nihilo"; in this we can perfectly agree with Pierre Duhem, without admitting that the problem in Pascal's case is one of priority alone. It is only recently that it has been possible to write an adequate history of the experiments which led to the discovery of the barometer ( cf. Cornelis de Waard, L'Experience barometrique, 1936) because many essential documents have remained unpublished and difficult of access. Mersenne's "doubts" for instance concerned Torricelli's antecedents; he suspected that Torricelli's elegant experiment with the inverted tube of mercury was a culmination in a series of events ("In cui us vero mentem prius ilia vacui cogitatio venerit et ·quis prior animadverterit collum tubi . . . scire fortassis jucundum fuerit" ), but he was unaware of the earlier experiments carried on in R ome by Berti and Magiotti. What therefore we shall endeavour to describe here is the manner in which Pascal became interested in the experiment, his particular activities in connection with it, his dubious attempts to establish the predominance of his own contribution, and also the peculiar methods of Pascalian exegesis. The question of priority will be discussed only as Pascal himself makes it necessary; and in so doing we shall be careful to' obey the rules as Pascal was later to formulate them in unequivocal fashion. Even when he was preparing his apology of the Christian religion, he burst out in slashing vituperation of Father Lalouere whom he accused of stealing other people's ideas on the subject of the cycloid: "And let him not try to save himself by the attestation of some friend-who might certify he had seen his book in manuscript before the first of J anuary. Such things are not done in matters of this kind, where publication alone counts." Torricelli died without troubling to publish abroad the success of his experiment with mercury in 1643 or his marvellously accurate interpretations of the phenomenon; Isaac Beeckman confided his ideas on the uniform propagation of air pressure to his private journal; Descartes was far from suspecting that anyone would demand universal admiration for something which in his mind was not above the level of a laboratory experiment, an experiment which he had himself suggested, as it were in passing, to a much younger man with a particular aptitude for that kind of thing. For Pascal on the contrary, publication was the main thing, publication and publicity. He it was who later cried: "Combien de royaumes nous ignorent !"
II
It was in the summer of 1644 that Mersenne received from Ricci extracts from two letters in which, as I have already mentioned, Torricelli described and interpreted his experiment with the column of mercury: "We live submerged," wrote Torricelli, "in an ocean of air, and we know by incontrovertible experiments that air has weight. The force [which causes the mercury to be suspended] comes from without: upon the surface of the liquid which is in the basin presses a column of air fifty miles high." The marvellous accuracy and completeness of this interpretation (air being compared to a liquid, and the phenomenon being explained in terms of the equilibrium of liquids) was what Pascal tried contemptuously to put aside as "a mere conjecture."
As a physicist, Mersenne had long since abandoned the essences and qualities of the Scholastics; mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena were the only ones he accepted. He was therefore not slow to recognize the importance of Torricelli's experiment, and asserted that the philosophy which satisfactorily explained the phenomenon would thereby assure its superiority over all other philosophies. He tried to repeat the experiment, but without success. The following year he went to Rome where he saw Ricci, and on his return he stopped off in Florence to visit Torricelli, who performed the experiment for his benefit. Back in Paris, Mersenne tried once more on his own account, and again failed. Blaming his lack of success on the inferior quality of his materials, he turned to the celebrated glassblowers of R ouen. As it happened, one of those he had interested in the experiment, Pierre Petit, inspector of fortifications, was setting out for Dieppe where he was to inspect a submarine device for remaining on the sea-floor "for five or six hours." Mersenne gave him his specifications and begged him to bring back a supply of glass tubes. In Petit's letter to Chanut of November 26, 1646, we have a detailed account of what happened. It is all perfectly clear. On his way to Dieppe, Petit passed through Rauen, where he acquainted Etienne Pascal with the nature of the experiment he and Mersenne were interested in; Etienne was delighted, writes Petit, "he asked if h e might be a spectator, and if we might do it together on my return from Dieppe." Petit agreed, and when he performed the experiment, in October, 1646, both Etienne and his son Blaise, then twenty-three years of age, were there to witness it. It was an e~act repetition, the first to be successfully carried out in France, of Torricelli's experiment of 1643, and this Pierre Petit categorically affirmed. Immediately there began between Petit and the two Pascals a discussion on the nature of the empty space above the column of mercury. "Mr. Pascal's son objected that the unsophisticated [les simpliciens] might say that this space which appeared to be empty was full of air, which in order to avoid the vacuum had entered through the pores of the glass; but I answered by asking him why in that case more air had not entered [in sufficient quantity to make] the mercury fall completely." The space, then, for all three was a vacuum; but it is to be noted that the whole discussion centred upon this point; not a word as to the cause of the phenomenon.
During the months that followed, Blaise Pascal carried out a number of modifications of the experiment and gave public lectures on the subject in which he unequivocally affirmed the existence of the vacuum against the opinion of Aristotelians and Cartesians alike. The inventor of the arithmetical machine took great pleasure in experimenting with tubes of various shapes and sizes, with water (as Berti had done in Rome between 1639 and 1641 ) , and with wine (as Galileo had suggested) .
Toward the end of May, 1647, Pascal left Rauen and established himself in Paris. The problems relating to the barometric tube were exciting no small amount of interest, and Mersenne was busy recording the many views that were being put forward. Pascal at this point seems to have occupied himself solely with the problem of the vacuum, but in Paris an equal interest was being manifested in the cause of the suspension of the liquid. Pascal's closest associate, Roberval, refused to accept as an explanation the weight of the atmosphere; for him the phenomenon was to be explained by a force of attraction. Brunschvicg agrees with Mathieu that it was probably as a result of Roberval's influence that Mersenne in the last chapter of his Reflectiones (a work which, composed over a period of three years, was finished in October, 164 7), enumerated the many possible objections to the theory of the "column of air" and expressed the opinion that the problem was insoluble. In July of that year, Mersenne received a letter from a certain DesNoyers, who had accompanied Marie de Gonzague, the wife of Wenceslas VII, to Warsaw. Des Noyers' letter contained a detailed description of an experiment with mercury, identical in every respect with Torricelli's, performed by a Capuchin monk, Father Valeriano Magni, .in the Polish capital, together with a copy of Magni's published account of the experiment in which he not only claimed to be its originator, but also affirmed the existence of the vacuum. In view of Pascal's convictions concerning the value of publication, we can have no difficulty in imagining the shock he must have received from Magni's brochure. We shall see in what manner he subsequently attempted to dispose of this unsuspected rival who had had the deplorable taste to forestall him. In the meantime, there was no time for delay. He hurriedly prepared his E xperiences nouvelles touchant le vide in which he describes his variations on the experiment performed by Pierre Petit, "because," as he carefully explained, "having carried out these experiments at much expenditure of money, time and trouble, I was afraid someone else who had employed neither time, money nor trouble, forestalling me, might publish things he had not seen and which he would consequently be unable to describe with the necessary order and exactitude" -admittedly a curious way of putting it.
This then was an abridged form (an Abrege) of a much more extensive treatise which Pascal promised repeatedly but which he never finished; it was published at this time in order to establish his rights and to silence any one who might take it into his head to repeat the kind of trick that Valeriano Magni had seen fit to play upon him. Pascal was careful to make the proper distinctions: "And as all honest men not only share that human inclination of hanging on to what is theirs, but will also refuse an honour which they do not deserve, you will no doubt approve me when I defend myself not only against those who would like to cheat me of some of the experiments I herein describe and which . . . are my own invention, but also against those who would attribute to me the Italian experiment . . . for it is not my invention."
The Abrege is important therefore as a means of establishing Pascal's claim as the inventor of a certain number of experiments, some of them of doubtful importance, and for its categorical affirmation of the vacuum. But it is also noteworthy because Pascal displays no interest whatever in the cause of the phenomenon: he merely repeats Galilee's theory of nature's limited, or mitigated, horror of a vacuum. Maxim I states: "That all bodies manifest a repugnance . . . . in admitting this apparent void: that is to say, that Nature abhors this apparent void." And Maxim III says: "That the force of this horror is limited . . . and equal to the force with which a column of water approximately thirty-one feet high tends to drop." Not only does Pascal fail to mention the name of Torricelli (parum candide egit), but he reveals the fact that his ideas are more antiquated than those already expressed by the Italian. There is not the slightest mention of the weight of air, or atmospheric pressure.
The publishing licence of the Abrege is dated O ctober 8, 164 7. A few days before it appeared Pascal received two visits, on September 22 and 23, from Rene Descartes. Descartes had heard much about Pascal's experiments on the vacuum from his correspondent Mersenne, although through some curious oversight Mersenne had entirely omitted to mention Torricelli's experiment in writing to the philosopher: Descartes had to wait four years in order to hear of it. This is one of the vagaries of history and can perhaps best be explained by the fact that Mersenne's mind was so completely occupied by the problems connected with the experiment that he must somehow have assumed that Descartes was familiar with it. Descartes discussed the void with Pascal in the presence of Roberval. It was of course his belief that the space in the tube was full of "subtle matter," but he disagreed equally with Roberval who maintained that the phenomenon of the column of mercury was due to the force of attraction. There is no need at this point to discuss Descartes' theory of the tourbillons which prevented him from ever arriving at the notion of atmospheric pressure. It is certain however that, in addition to the empty space above the mercury, he was interested in the cause of the phenomenon and attributed it to the external weight of the "column of air" immediately above the open surface of the mercury in the basin; and, as we have seen, Descartes on several occasions referred to the fact that in the course of these interviews he had suggested the advisability of repeating the experiment at various altitudes. He first mentions this in a letter dated exactly ten weeks after his visit, when the matter was fresh in his mind, and there is not the slightest suggestion, as we have seen, that he ~as in the least conscious of any rivalry between himself and Pascal. Felix Mathieu has pointed out one very significant fact in this connection: Mersenne for some time subsequent to Descartes' sojourn in Paris and to his letter of December 13 can think and write of nothing but mountains! If the "column of air" is really the cause everybody is seeking, there is a way of proving it : the h eight of the mercury should vary with the altitude. Mathieu writes:
This idea appears for the first time in the preface Mersenne added to his R eflectiones. The book was finished on September 8, 1647: in it Mersenne despaired of finding the solution to the problem. The preface was written after the 8th and before October 1st . . . at precisely the moment when Descartes was passing through Paris. Mersenne reverts to the explanation by the "column of air" as being not only intelligible but satisfactory: "to verify it, it would be necessary to do the experiment at different altitudes. . . ." Mersenne went further: on J anuary 8, 1648, he wrote to his friend Le Tenneur, presumably in Clermont, begging him to perform the experiment on the Puy-de-Dome! Unfortunately Le Tenneur was prevented from giving M ersenne the honour of forestalling Pascal for two reasons, the one, geographical, b eing that he happened to be in Tours at the time; the other reason was mental: "Furthermore," he wrote in answer to Mersenne, "I shall tell you that I think, along with Roberval, that it would be trouble w~ted, and that at the top the same result would be attained as down below." Decidedly, Mersenne's luck was out. It should be noted moreover that Pascal's closest associate was of the same opinion as Le Tenneur. It is at this point t hat Arsovitch asks why, if Descartes was sensitive about his priority rights, he did not complain of Mersenne's preface.
In the meantime, Pascal, having published his Experiences nouvelles, found himself engaged in a controversy with Father Etienne Noel, the rector of the Jesuit college of Clermont in Paris .. Father Noel had formerly been one of D escartes' professors at La Fleche. In his letters to Pascal in defence of the plenum, he revealed himself to be a kindly, courteous, open-minded, and generous opponent. The same cannot be said of Pascal, even though his reply to Noel's first letter can be justly admired as a masterly exposition of the experimental method. Noel may have b een addicted to the a priori reasoning of the School, but he was no fool : he had a very clear idea as to how far a m an in his position could go in publishing his ideas, and what he said in his published works was not always identical with what he wrote in private to Blaise Pascal. These variations called forth Pascal's jeering sarcasms which do little to enhance our opinion of either his character or his judgment. In his second letter to Pascal, Noel pays homage to the ability of his younger colleague, asserting that the latter's reply to his first letter has caused him to change some of his opinions, and in closing he states : "If I were not laid up with a poor leg, I should do myself the honour of going to see you." This courteous suggestion met with no response. Pascal did not take the trouble to visit Noel or even to answer him, for which he later gave some very strange reasons. Noel's letter seems to have profoundly irritated him. Why? Can it be that his correspondent had broached the subject of the cause, and had quite correctly explained it in terms of atmospheric pressure? And this before Pascal had given any signs of arriving at similar conclusions? In view of what we know of Pascal's insistence on priority rights in such matters, we can understand why he would like to give Noel's second letter as little publicity as possible, especially as Valeriano Magni had managed to get into print three months before him on the subject of the vacuum. 
This letter of November 15 is the crux of Mathieu's argument against
Pascal and the tarte a la creme of Pascal's defenders. For the latter, it is enough that Pascal so dated it. Felix Mathieu is not so easily satisfied: he has brought powerful arguments to bear-as yet never satisfactorily answered by the Pascalians-which seem to show that Pascal deliberately antedated this letter, and also that it was never really published by him at all.
It is in fact an amazing document. Pascal is writing to his brother-inlaw with instructions to carry out the experiment with mercury on the Puyde-Dome. Although he asserts that Perier has very recently ("ces jours passes") been in Paris, he gives him in most serious and doctoral fashion a tedious account of his reflections on the vacuum, things with which Perier must have been exceedingly familiar if he' had recently spent any time in Pascal's company. The letter reads exactly like a prospectus addressed to the public, and it is for this reason that Gustave Lanson affirmed that he for one had never taken it to be anything else, that it was simply "un marceau de litterature"; nor did Lanson take the date of November 15 very seriously: how could an Auvergnat suggest in November to another Auvergnat that he go to the top of a mountain which both knew to be inaccessible at that time of year. This may be good enough to fool Parisians, but for the people of Clermont, who see the Puy-de-Dome from the Place de J au de, it is "pur verbiage.'' Not that Pascal was trying to deceive anybody, Lanson hastily adds. Nevertheless, if the date is accepted seriously by historians, he has certainly succeeded in deceiving a good many. For this date upsets the chronology established by all other evidence. After entertaining Perier with the history of his doubts and hesitations which explained why in his published Abrege he attributed the column of mercury to Nature's horror of a vacuum, whereas all along his real belief was that "these effects should be attributed to the weight and pressure of the atmosphere," Pascal goes on to remind his brotherin-law that during the latter's recent visit, ces jours passes, he had shown him an experiment which was nothing less than a vacuum within a vacuum. It was in fact a remarkable bit of experimental ingenuity that made it possible to carry out the Torricellian experiment in the vacuum of another Torricellian tube. "You saw," writes Pascal, "that the quicksilver of the inner tube fell completely, . . . when, by means of the vacuum with which it was surrounded, it was no longer pressed or counterbalanced by any air." This is exactly what Torricelli had predicted would happen in his letter of June 28, 1644.
If this did not prove that air pressure was the cause of the phenomenon, one wonders what further evidence of the fact could be obtained in performing the experiment at different altitudes. Without exception, Pascal's contemporaries, including Roberval, accepted this experiment as decisive. Nothing, however, is more edifying than Pascal's extreme reluctance to abandon without due consideration the principles "which have come down to us from Antiquity"-and Brunschvicg has done his best to believe and to induce others to believe with Pascal that nature's horror of a vacuum could still explain the effects of the "vacuum in the vacuum" and that no definitive conclusion could be reached without the Puy-de-Dome: the importance of the Great Experiment must at all costs be safeguarded.
But all the known evidence goes to show that whoever the inventor might be, the experiment of the vacuum within a vacuum was not performed before the month of May, 1648 (and in the form that Pascal describes in his letter it could certainly not have been performed until much later). Mathieu has fixed the moment at which it became known to the scientific world: as late as May 31, Mersenne, writing to Hevelius, has given up all hope of solving the mystery of the column of mercury, and expresses the belief it will not be solved until a more fortunate epoch; and on July 3, Theodor Haak, one of the founders of the Royal Society, writing from London to Mersenne in answer to his "esteemed letter of June 12," says: "I do not yet know how to perform your most recent experiment consisting of one tube inside another which [causes the mercury to fall completely in the first], not yet having been able to do it successfully.'' Strangely enough, it is in June that Pascal's closest associate, Roberval, who until then had stoutly maintained his theory of attraction, for the first time asserts that the outside pressure of the air is the cause. And yet another coincidence: the purely fortuitous discovery by Tannery, in the Imperial Library of Vienna, of the correspondence of Le Tenneur, reveals what until the end of the nineteenth century was an unknown historical fact: Perier could not possibly have been in Paris in the weeks preceding November 15, 1647. On the other hand, he was certainly in Paris in June, 1648.
Everything points to the fact that the letter dated November 15, 1647, in which Pascal gives instructions for the Great Experiment was written, at the earliest, in June, 1648. If this is so, why then did Pascal deliberately date it eight months earlier? Quite simply, to establish his rights of priority. Until June, 1648, Pascal to all intents and purposes is in the camp of those who hold to the traditional notion of Nature's fuga vacui. The vacuum in the vacuum has suddenly revealed the correctness of the opposite theory-the theory already arrived at in Italy by Torricelli, and in France by Descartes and Father Noel. Pascal disposes of Torricelli-Italy is a long way off-by never referring to him. But Noel might suddenly feel inclined to publish his reply of November, 1647 (which Pascal had thought best not to answer, and about which he was most discreetly silent) ; and then there were the interviews with Descartes in which, on Jacqueline's own evidence, the philosopher had strongly affirmed the external nature of the cause, and according to his own affirmation had suggested the experiment at various altitudes.
Brunschvicg and Strowski ridicule Pascal's attackers by pointing out that Pascal, if he had been trying to get ahead of Descartes, must have.been a fearful idiot not to date his letter earlier than the meeting in September. Pascal in fact would have been a much greater idiot had he done so. He had to be careful not to antedate his own published Abrege of October 8, in which he affirmed the fuga vacui, and also his letter to Noel, written in November. The best he could do under these circumstances was to date his letter as early as possible in November, suggesting that at that time the idea of the Puy-deDome was not new to him.
But there was something else that had to be taken care of. If there is one thing that is perfectly clear from a reading of this document, it is Pascal's anxiety to explain that the experiment of the vacuum in the vacuum was not conclusive, and in no '_Nay diminished the necessity or the importance of the experiment on the Puy-de-Dome. It has been assumed, and Gilberte Perier affirmed it, that Pascal was the one who first performed this decisive experiment. Aside from Gilberte's hagiographical prose, the only other contemporary to attribute it to Pascal waS precisely Father Noel in his Gravitas comparata; but this affirmation must be treated with a certain reserve, especially as Noel describes an experiment which is not the one described by Pascal. On the other hand, the celebrated Jean Pecquet affirmed quite definitely in 1651 that the experiment was the work of Adrien Auzout, Pascal's friend and associate in Rauen. ("Lubet etiam . . . te vacui in vacuo, tentatum prima feliciter acutissimi Auzotii sagacitate. . . . Experimentum condocefacere".) Auzout was a remarkable man in the laboratory, but he cared little for publication. Pecquet's statement was naturally embarrassing to Pascal's editors, but because Mathieu had used this document, they were obliged to include it in their forthcoming edition of Pascal's works. The difficulty was met by a very simple device: the omission of the word primo (see vol. III, p. 238 ) ; Pecquet is simply made to say that Auzout successfully performed it-his claim to priority is quietly suppressed. Mter all, how many people have access to Pecquet's Dissertatio de circulatione sanguinis et chyli motu?
Yet whoever it was who first performed this experiment, for those who are familiar with Pascal's attitude of mind on these matters there is one very clear proof that it is at least not his: he himself is careful never to claim it. At a moment when he is most harshly asserting his rights and triumphantly announcing the importance of the Great Experiment, credit for which is due to him alone, there is one experiment he does not once refer to as his own, and that is the vacuum in the vacuum. Nor is it likely that Pascal, having himself invented it in 164 7, was keeping it for publication at some convenient and dramatic moment. We have seen how he was stirred by Magni's brochure into a hurried composition of his Abrege; it is not probable he would have allowed himself to be caught napping a second time if in his portfolio he possessed the answer to the problem that was then absorbing the whole world of science.
If then it is true that the date of November 15 is a falsification, how could Pascal possibly have the impudence to publish his letter under this date in his Recit of 1648? Would it not be denounced immediately by those who could not help knowing the facts? The answer most probably is that he had it printed in 1648 but did not publish it, that it appeared for the first time posthumously in Perier's edition of 1663. Mathieu has given us the strange story of the R ecit of 1648, which was printed without licence or permission, and which seems to have passed, if distributed it was, almost unnoticed. At least in part. For the brochure dated 1648 (which includes along with Pascal's shout of triumph, a copy of the letter of questionable date addressed to Perier, a copy of Perier's letter to Pascal of September 22, 1648, and the Relation de !'experience faite par monsieur Perier ) was evidently printed at two different times. Mathieu has shown that between folios A and B on the one hand, and folios C, D, E, on the other, there is a difference in the quality of the type, a difference in the number of lines per page, and differences in spelling. Furthermore every single reference made to the Recit by contemporaries who saw it (we have seen that Descartes was not one of these) seems to indicate that the persons concerned were unaware of anything contained in Pascal's letter to Perier. Some contemporary writers refer to the experiment as being due to Florin Perier: they could not possibly be ignorant of the facts if Pascal's letter had been included in the Recit. Father Maignan who was associated with the earlier Italian experiments long before Pascal had ever heard of them, says only that the results of the Puy-de-Dome were given by Perier, "ut habetur in praeclara eius ad Pascalem epistola hac de re Parisiis anno 1648 edita"; he does not mention the contents of the letter dated November, and, as pointed out by Arsovitch, in an analysis of a hundred pages devoted to the vacuum in his Cursus philosophicus there is not one word concerning the vacuum in the vacuum. When Descartes asks Carcavi for information about the experiment, Carcavi replies that it has already been performed and that it is already in print: he does not send Descartes a copy, but gives him a summary of Perier's letter to Pascal, and it is evident that Carcavi knows nothing of the claims made by Pascal in his letter to Perier. Furthermore, it is certain that Jean Pecquet had seen no printed account of the vacuum in the vacuum.
In short, all the known evidence goes to show that the famous letter was written after the event; that it was intended to safeguard Pascal's claims to priority, not only with regard to Descartes and possibly Noel, but in particular with regard to the laboratory experiment of the vacuum in the vacuum. But more than anything else, it was meant to convey the idea that this experiment had in no way lessened the importance of the Great Experiment, that it was an inconclusive preliminary to the Puy-de-Dome. Whereas it is evident that of the two experiments it is the vacuum in the vacuum which most conclusively proves that the suspension of mercury is due to the extrinsic cause of atmospheric pressure. Pascal claims that the Puy-de-Dome is stil1 necessary "since it is certain that the weight of the air is greater at the foot of the mountain than on the top." He thus completely reverses the situation, for with the known results of the vacuum in the vacuum, and the principle of the barometer being established, the Great Experiment proved not what Pascal claimed still to be seeking, but the very fact whicl;l he and others had taken for granted, namely the variations of atmospheric pressure at different altitudes.
The In it Pascal states that, in the presentation of the theses mentioned, the candidate had affirmed that there were "certain persons claiming to be the inventors of a certain experiment of which Torricelli was the author, and which had been performed in Poland; that these persons, wishing to attribute it to themselves, after having performed it in Normandy had published it in Auvergne." Pascal, thus attacked, this time insisted on hurriedly publishing his reply before Ribeyre, who claimed to have no recollection of the incident, had a chance to investigate the matter. In his anger, Pascal desires to acquaint the Jesuit with the history of the affair "from the beginning." In answer to the first accusation (that of neglecting to attribute the experiment to its proper author), he affirms: "on every possible occasion, I have never failed to say that this experiment came from Italy, and that it is the inven~ tion of Torricelli." And Thiriot is quite right in observing that Pascal could very well have said so on many an occasion, but that he never once committed the statement to print. Twice only, Thiriot continues, did the name of Torricelli ever appear over Pascal's signature, and that was when he accused Noel of indelicately forgetting to quote him. Father Thiriot might have added that this text is in Pascal's letter to Le Pailleur, a letter Pascal never published, and which was first printed by Bossut in 1779! Pascal continues: "In the year 164-4, the Reverend Father Mersenne received word that this Experiment had been performed in Italy, without any specifications as to the name of the author, so that we were left in ignorance on that point." As mentioned earlier, Mersenne was in some doubt about Torricelli's antecedents, but he knew perfectly well that Torricelli had performed the experiment in the form which Petit was to repeat under the eyes of Pascal in Rouen. Nor was Petit in any doubt on the matter, and Pascal possessed a copy of his letter to Chanut. But Pascal asserts in spite of this that as late as O ctober, 1647, in publishing his Abrege, he was only able to say that the experiment was of Italian origin. "But as we were impatient to know the identity of the Inventor, we wrote to Rome, to Del Pozzo, who long after my Abrege was printed informed us that Torricelli was in fact the author." This is the story that Pascal is so anxious to circulate in 1651.
The second point concerned Magni's experiment in Warsaw. Pascal's reply is a cool accusation of plagiarism against the Capuchin : "Let him [Pascal's accuser] then know that I performed this experiment in 1646 . . . that in 1647 I printed an account of all my experiments; that my brochure was sent to Poland . . . and that a year later Father Valeriano performed this Torricellian experiment." At this point, even Brunschvicg is forced to admit the astonishing inaccuracy of Pascal's chronology: Magni is accused of taking the idea of an experiment he performed in July, 1647, from a work Pascal published the following October I Pascal continues: "The worthy Father printed an account of this experiment which was sent immediately to us; and we were very much surprised to see he had taken credit for Torricelli's Experiment." Pascal's indignation is assuredly edifying, and some have allowed themselves ~o be edified: "Nothing," writes H. F. Stewart in his Secret of Pascal, "could be more dignified than his [Pascal's] readiness to give honour where it is due in scientific experiment; cf. his letter to Ribeyre of July 12, 1651." Yet Professor Stewart must have known, or should have known, tlie belated nature of this recognition, wrung from Pascal at a time when he himself was on the defensive; it is no slight exaggeration to speak of Pascal's "readiness."
Pascal then proceeds to silence his unnamed adversary with documentary evidence: "And if the worthy Father needs further proof, let him know that How could such a wealth of detail fail to be convincing! Yet Roberval could not h~ve said all this in September about something not printed before October 8. In this case, however, we are not reduced to conjecture : Roberval's letter exists, and not a single word of what Pascal has "quoted" is to be found in it.
In the remainder of his letter to Ribeyre, Pascal outlines the events leading up to the Great Experiment, destined to test Torricelli's "simple conjecture." The account of this experiment was scattered far and wide, and "was received with joy, as it had been impatiently awaited." We have seen that the Recit did not reach Descartes, for one, and none of the expressions of joy have come down to us. In fact, as we have seen, most of Pascal's contemporaries were unaware of its existence, and even his heirs, who printed it in 1663, seem to have seen it for the first time after his death. As for the most decisive event of all, the experiment of the vacuum in the vacuum, there is no mention of it in the letter to Ribeyre. And Pascal concludes: "It is true, sir, and I say it boldly, that this Experiment is my invention; and therefore I can say that the new knowledge it has given us, is entirely due to me." We have therefore Pascal's word for it, published more than a year after the philosopher's death, that Descartes had nothing to do with it; for that matter, neither had Mersenne nor the vacuum in the vacuum. It is regrettable that this claim should be made in a letter in which so many inaccuracies occur. Mathieu used a stronger word, and Louis Havet ingenuously confessed: "everyone would say these were lies, if it were anyone else than Blaise Pascal."
In this letter, then, as in the letter to Perier dated November 15, 1647, as in the letter to Le Pailleur, we have evidence for Mathieu's interpretation that Pascal sometimes gave way to the urge to rearrange events as he would have wished them to happen. A victim of pain and illness, living for long periods in solitude, did he indulge in such imaginings? The fact that he never published some of the incriminating documents might easily lend support to this view.
Historians of Pascal, however, through too great an eagerness to accept .these documents uncritically, have exaggerated unduly two aspects of Pascal: they have magnified the myth of what Chateaubriand called "cet effrayant genie," and they have suggested that his reluctance to publish certain of his writings is attributable to his scorn of human learning and to his devotion to a Higher Truth.
